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Abstract In this paper we analyze the long-run relationship between output col-
lapses—defined as GDP falling substantially below trend—and total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP). We use a panel of 76 developed and developing countries during
the period 1960–2004 to identify episodes of output collapse and estimate coun-
terfactual post-collapse TFP trends. Collapses are concentrated in developing
countries, especially Africa and Latin America, and were particularly widespread in
the 1980s in Latin America. Overall, output collapses are systematically associated
with long-lasting declines in TFP. We explore the conditions under which collapses
are least or most damaging, as well as the type of shocks that make collapses more
likely or severe. Furthermore, we provide a quantification of the associated welfare
loss with output collapses.
Keywords Growth  Recessions  Productivity  Recovery
JEL Classification F43  O40
1 Introduction
This paper assesses the evolution of long-run total factor productivity (TFP)
dynamics after a significant collapse of GDP and its associated welfare impact,
measured by the resulting gap between actual and counterfactual levels of TFP. We
focus on the TFP gap instead of the GDP gap in order to leave aside gross output
reductions associated with lower factor accumulation. Thus, the TFP gap is a
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measure of efficiency costs directly linked to welfare losses, net of investment costs
in factor accumulation. Cleary, the potential welfare costs of a GDP collapse will
depend critically on the persistence of the subsequent TFP gap: i.e. the faster the
recovery in productivity, the lower the welfare cost. Given our focus on welfare
costs, we are particularly interested in exploring the conditions and shocks under
which a GDP collapse is associated with a very persistent—possibly permanent—
decline of aggregate productivity.
This focus on TFP jibes well with the well established finding that TFP is the
main determinant of economic development in the long run (e.g. see Easterly and
Levine 2001). For example, the empirical evidence of growth accounting exercises
shows that a systematic shortfall in TFP growth is the main factor behind the
widening gap in per capita income between Latin America and developed
countries over the past 50 years (Blyde and Ferna´ndez-Arias 2005). This is also
consistent with the evidence compiled by Kehoe and Prescott (2007) that changes
in TFP are the main driver of the 16 great depressions during the 20th century
studied in their book. While these papers basically perform an accounting
exercise, in most cases the implicit causality goes from TFP shocks to output
performance. A mechanic interpretation of our focus on the evolution of TFP after
an output collapse could suggest an implicit causality in the opposite direction, but
we acknowledge that causality could run both ways, as pointed out by Cerra and
Saxena (2008).
While we explore the causal interpretation of growth collapses leading to persistent
productivity effects by specifically looking at a subsample of collapse episodes
generated by exogenous factors, by and large we take an agnostic approach.1
Therefore, the main contribution of the paper is to explore the productivity dynamics
after an output collapse and the transmission channels at work.
If collapses are associated with detrimental persistent effects on the level of TFP,
then they may lead to a lower average growth rate of GDP over long periods of time.
If so, output shocks may generate a widening income gap between those countries
that experience lots of them and those that do not, on account of those countries with
incomplete TFP recovery within the sampling period. In particular, a permanently
lower level of TFP would translate into a permanent effect on the level of GDP and,
therefore, a reduction in the long-term growth rates. If sharp output collapses are
associated with persistent declines in TFP, they could be an important factor behind
the absolute income divergence that has been observed in the world according to
Pritchett (1997).
Our methodological approach is based on a characterization of the anatomy of
events and an exploration of some factors that have a significant correlation with the
magnitude and duration of the decline in TFP. This alternative to the standard cross-
1 An alternative approach to avoid some of these endogeneity problems would be to focus on TFP
collapses. However, in our sample all output collapses would also classify as TFP collapses for the same
threshold. Furthermore, given that TFP is computed as Solow residuals, it tends to be more volatile and
noisy, such that for a given threshold there tend to be more ‘‘false’’ episodes, which makes the focus on
output collapses more appealing. Finally, the literature the paper relates to has been focusing on the
dynamics of macroeconomic variables after output collapses, such that for comparability it is useful to
concentrate on output collapses.
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country panel approach used in the empirical growth literature has received some
attention in recent times due to the methodological shortcomings of cross-country
regressions and their disappointing results in terms of policy evaluation. For
example, Pritchett (2000) points out that systematic differences across countries in
volatility and trends of GDP series make cross-country growth regressions
essentially uninformative, while an approach that establishes some stylized facts
by analyzing episodes and events associated with surges or collapses of output
might be more enlightening.2
From a theoretical point of view, once market equilibrium in factor accumulation
and utilization is restored after an output collapse, the existence of permanent
income effects depends on the resulting steady-state aggregate productivity or TFP.
In fact, if steady-state productivity remains unchanged, then growth rates would be
altered during the period of collapse and recovery but the (average) long-term
growth rate over this cycle would not. Consequently, welfare costs would be
limited, associated with the transitory cyclical downturn. By contrast, if the collapse
is associated with a decline in steady-state TFP, that is to say, if there is
‘‘productivity destruction’’, then income would be reduced permanently and welfare
costs would not be confined to a transition period but would continue accruing
permanently.
In the framework of a neoclassical growth model, an output collapse may be
caused by an exogenous collapse in TFP or by shocks to distortions on investment
and utilization of physical capital and other inputs, called ‘‘wedges’’ in the literature
(see Chari et al. 2007), with no permanent effect on productivity. By contrast,
endogenous growth theory provides a better framework to understand the potential
mechanisms by which output collapses, whatever their cause, could have a
permanent impact on TFP. In these models, an output collapse may erode the
fundamentals behind aggregate TFP, thus lowering trend GDP. Furthermore, in
some endogenous growth models a collapse may actually diminish the steady-state
rate of growth of TFP and consequently of GDP, further reducing trend GDP and
increasing the welfare cost.3
A number of endogenous growth models could account for a permanent effect
on TFP following an output shock. For example, in models of knowledge
accumulation, like Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), a reduction
in the fraction of the labor force engaged in research and development (R&D)
could have permanent negative effects on the level of productivity. Moreover, if
the production of new knowledge depends largely on the stock of existing
knowledge, the growth rate of productivity could also be permanently affected.
Therefore, in these models, shocks that affect the return of the factors engaged in
R&D relative to those engaged in the production of final goods could have
potential long standing consequences on productivity. Martin and Rogers (1997)
employ an endogenous growth model in which labor productivity is augmented
2 See e.g. on growth accelerations Hausmann et al. (2005), as well as Jones and Olken (2008) on
accelerations and decelerations.
3 In addition, the steady-state TFP level usually is a determinant of the steady-state growth rate in these
models, such that a permanent level effect could potentially also have a deteriorating effect on the steady-
state growth rate of output.
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through learning by doing to show that recessions are periods in which
opportunities for acquiring experience and improving productivity are foregone.
Even if productivity growth resumes after a recession, there would be a permanent
wedge in the level of productivity.
There is a growing literature studying the role of policy distortions and TFP (see
e.g. Parente and Prescott 2000). Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), for example,
develop a model of firm heterogeneity in which policies that distort the relative
price faced by individual firms can result in large declines of aggregate productivity
due to the misallocation of resources. Although not directly related to recessions, the
model implies that if crises lead to an upsurge of these distortionary policies,
aggregate TFP and output could be significantly affected in the long-run. The facts
show that governments often use subsidies, tariffs and quotas, undervalued
exchange rates or other policies after recessions to revitalize output and
employment. Although such policies can ignite the economy in the short run, they
may also hinder aggregate efficiency in the long run to the extent they are not
removed and lead to misallocation of resources. Furthermore, output collapses
might be accompanied by institutional and social breakdowns, which may destroy
intangible ‘‘capital’’ needed for efficient economic cooperation.
There is another strand of the literature that shows that economic crisis may
have positive impacts on TFP. Following Schumpeter’s notion of creative
destruction, Caballero and Hammour (1994), for example, show that recessions
may cleanse the economy of inefficient firms, leading to higher productivity and
output growth. A related idea is the ‘‘pit-stop’’ view of recessions, according to
which recessions are seen as times when profitability is low and, therefore, much
needed restructuring can be undertaken because of a temporarily low opportunity
cost (Aghion and Saint-Paul 1998).4 Ranciere et al. (2008) present evidence that
countries which have suffered occasional crises—identified as a sharp collapse in
credit growth—grow faster. They also present a model consistent with a positive
correlation between risk and economic growth under certain conditions. In
addition, there is also a political economy argument for a positive effect of crises
on growth. For example Tommasi and Velsco (1996)argue that economic crises
facilitate economic reforms.5
As the discussion above shows, in theory it is possible that output collapses are
associated with positive or negative effects on productivity that last for long periods
of time or even permanently. As an empirical matter, there are a number of papers in
the literature that address related issues. Cerra and Saxena (2008) use panel-VAR
techniques to show that GDP growth is significantly and persistently lower after
financial crises and some types of political crises. Our work is complementary to
their, given that they do not explore whether this persistent decline in growth is due
to a decline in factor accumulation or mainly due to a lower TFP growth.
4 Empirically, however, there is evidence that this restructuring process does not always occur. For
example, using data on US manufacturing firms, Caballero and Hammour (2005) show that the
restructuring process is depressed, not increased, by an aggregate recessionary shock.
5 In a related paper, Drazen and Easterly (2001) test the hypothesis that macroeconomic crises induce
growth acceleration but fail to find significant effects.
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Jones and Olken (2008) identify episodes of GDP growth accelerations and
collapses using a small-sample version of a structural break tests by Bai and Perron
(1998, 2003) to detect regime changes. They identify 73 breaks in 48 countries
using Penn World Table data, of which 43 are down-breaks and 30 up-breaks. Their
results show interesting asymmetries between growth ignitions and collapses. In
particular, while growth accelerations are associated with increases in trade, without
a significant change in investment rates, collapses in GDP growth are associated
with a significantly lower investment, inflation, devaluations and internal conflict.
Our approach differs in various aspects from this paper. We concentrate on the
question of whether TFP returns to it potential level taking into account initial
conditions and the evolution of the TFP frontier. More than 62% of all the collapses
identified by Jones and Olken (2008) occurred in the 1970’s during the global
productivity slowdown of the world economy. This suggests that—especially for
developing countries—it is important to take into account what happens to its
technological frontier in order to construct the level of TFP that would have
prevailed in the absence of a crisis. Second, we focus on output collapses, defined as
a large departure below the trend level of GDP, rather than growth collapses, which
can be the natural consequence of an unsustainable boom, without implying a major
crisis with destructive potential. Furthermore, we identify the events as a decline
below a common threshold for all countries. This has the advantage that we capture
all large events, rather than relying on a statistical identification of events that
depends critically on the variability of the time series. This limitation explains why
important crises, like the Uruguayan currency and banking crises in the early
1980’s, Argentina’s collapse during the hyperinflation of 1989, or Chile’s collapse
around the rise and fall of the Allende regime, are not identified as episodes using
Jones and Olken’s methodology.
Several additional papers look at growth performance during extreme events,
although without reference to productivity or other structural underpinnings relevant
for long-run effects on income and welfare which are the focus of our paper. For
example, similar to Jones and Olken (2008), Berg et al. (2006) and Hausmann et al.
(2006) analyze the factors related to the duration of growth spells or collapses.
Becker and Mauro (2006) analyze episodes of output drops but their main concern is
on the nature of the shocks behind these drops rather than on the evolution of
productivity. We use several of their classifications of shocks to analyze whether the
evolution of TFP differs according to the type of shocks associated with the output
collapse. Hong and Tornell (2005) analyze the recovery of GDP growth during
currency crises. They find that growth rates rapidly return to pre-crisis levels but
may not surpass them, thus possibly producing a persistent effect on GDP levels, but
in contrast to our paper, they focus on cyclical GDP dynamics during currency
crisis. Finally, our paper is also somewhat related to Calvo et al. (2006) on the
miraculous recoveries after systemic financial crises. However, their emphasis is on
the short-run or cyclical performance of TFP during systemic sudden stops in capital
flows to emerging markets, while we focus on the long-run or permanent
consequences of a broader class of output collapses.
We look at a panel of 76 countries during the period 1960–2004 to identify
episodes of GDP collapses and estimate the counterfactual post-collapse TFP trend.
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We test whether output collapses are systematically associated with temporary or
permanent declines of aggregate productivity and measure their welfare costs in
terms of GDP forgone. Although results differ across countries and regions, the
analysis shows that the losses from productivity destruction can be substantial. In
addition, we characterize the types of shocks that are associated with output
collapses and quantify the corresponding welfare losses.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and identifies the
output collapses in the sample. The next section constructs the counterfactuals of
trend TFP and tests whether the effects on productivity after collapses are temporary
or permanent. It also analyzes how these effects differ across time and regions, and
performs some robustness checks. In Sect. 4 we explore how productivity effects
differ depending on the types of shocks associated with output collapses and
estimate the extent of the post-collapse loss in terms of the welfare costs. Section 5
concludes.
2 Identification of output collapses
The main focus of the paper is the behavior of TFP in the long run. Therefore, our
sample comprises countries for which we could construct long series of GDP,
physical capital, labor inputs and education. The sample consists of 76 countries
(shown in Table 8 in the ‘‘Appendix’’), which is the maximum number of
countries with available information, for the period 1960–2004. The TFP series
are computed for each country as a residual from the following Cobb–Douglas
production function.7 The real GDP (PPP-adjusted) and investment data are taken
from the Penn World Table 6.2. Capital stocks are constructed using perpetual
inventory method—as it standard in the literature—following the parameterization
of Easterly and Levine (2001). The labor input is measured by the labor force,
also from PWT 6.2. We follow Hall and Jones (1999) and construct series for the
relative efficiency of a unit of labor based on years of education. The data on
education is taken from the Barro and Lee (2000) data set. For more details on the
series and TFP computation see Blyde et al. (2008) and Daude and Ferna´ndez-
Arias (2010).
2.1 Collapses in output
There is no unique way to identify collapses in output. We consider that an economy
has experienced a collapse when its output falls significantly below its potential or
trend level.8 An alternative approach would be to look at a collapse in the growth
rate. However, a large negative growth rate of output is not necessarily an indication
6 In Blyde et al. (2008) for the sake of completeness we also analyze the behavior of factor accumulation
after a collapse. We show that most of the reduction in GDP per capita is due to lower TFP rather than
physical investment.
7 Such that Y = AKa(hL)1-a, where Y represent domestic output, K physical capital, L labor force, h the
average quality of the labor force and A is measured TFP.
8 A similar definition is used in Bergoeing et al. (2004).
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of a crisis as the economy might be returning to its equilibrium after a period of
unusually high growth. Our definition of collapse (a substantial negative gap
between the observed output level and its potential or trend level) excludes these
episodes. For example, if we define a growth collapse as a decline in real GDP
growth by more than two standard deviations from the country’s average growth
rate, out of 80 episodes of this type in our sample only 27 are also output collapses
in our definition.
In order to calculate the relevant output gap, we first de-trend GDP per capita
on a country-by-country basis using the Hodrick–Prescott filter. Then we identify
and select only output gaps that are 6% or larger, which is also the average
decline in GDP growth rates for the collapses identified by Jones and Olken
(2008) using time-series structural break tests by country. Alternatively, we also
use the largest 5% deviations from trend across country in the whole sample. As
pointed out above, the advantage of a uniform threshold across countries is that
this procedure makes sure that our events are ‘‘large’’ from an economic point of
view. In contrast, if we were to consider extreme events from a statistical point of
view on a country-by-country basis, e.g. events that fall below two or three
standard deviations, economically small collapses in countries with very low
volatility would be identified as events, while large crises might go undetected in
countries with high output volatility.
Given that prolonged depressions and periods of instability often imply
consecutive output gaps below the threshold, we proceeded to eliminate all
episodes that follow in a three-year span another episode. Furthermore, because
some of the collapses occurred very early in the sample period, the lack of adequate
numbers of observations does not allow an accurate estimation of the counterfac-
tual.9 In some other cases, like Argentina 2002, the collapse occurred only 2 years
before the end of the sample period. For these particular cases, making a comparison
after such a short period of time would bias the results towards a ‘‘lack of recovery’’
type of story. Therefore, we also eliminate episodes that took place within less than
4 years from the end of our sample. After these adjustments, we are left with 75
collapses considering the 6% threshold, and 65 episodes for the alternative
threshold.
Table 1 shows the collapses by countries and years for both definitions of
collapses used in the paper. Only two are in developed countries (Finland 1992, and
Portugal 1986), although there are also four collapses in high-income non-OECD
countries, Hong Kong and Singapore. All the other collapses are found in
developing countries. Figure 1 shows the number of collapses by decades and
regions. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America are the regions with most
collapses (28 and 22, respectively), followed by the Asian countries (ASIA), Middle
East and Northern Africa (MENA) and OTHER (which basically includes Finland
and Portugal and developing countries in Europe). The 1980s is the decade with
most collapses (34 episodes). The number of collapses during this decade almost
9 Also, measured TFP in early sample periods might be affected by the assumptions regarding the
construction of the capital stock. Daude and Ferna´ndez-Arias (2010) show that after a ten-year period
alternative measures of capital tend to converge.
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Table 1 Output collapse episodes 1970–1999
Country Year Deviation from
trend output
Top 5% Country Year Deviation from
trend output
Top 5%
Algeria 1971 -0.07 Yes Mali 1973 -0.06 No
Argentina 1989 -0.11 Yes Mali 1982 -0.07 Yes
Benin 1977 -0.10 Yes Mexico 1995 -0.06 No
Bolivia 1970 -0.07 Yes Mozambique 1985 -0.17 Yes
Brazil 1983 -0.09 Yes Nepal 1980 -0.06 No
Cameroon 1977 -0.07 Yes Nicaragua 1979 -0.10 Yes
Cameroon 1993 -0.06 No Nicaragua 1991 -0.07 Yes
Chile 1975 -0.14 Yes Niger 1973 -0.17 Yes
Chile 1983 -0.08 Yes Niger 1984 -0.08 Yes
Costa Rica 1982 -0.07 Yes Niger 1996 -0.06 No
Dominican
Republic
1990 -0.07 Yes Panama 1979 -0.06 No
Ecuador 1987 -0.09 Yes Panama 1988 -0.08 Yes
Egypt 1975 -0.11 Yes Papua New Guinea 1974 -0.10 Yes
Fiji 1983 -0.07 Yes Papua New Guinea 1990 -0.13 Yes
Finland 1992 -0.07 Yes Peru 1983 -0.08 Yes
Ghana 1976 -0.08 Yes Peru 1989 -0.07 Yes
Ghana 1983 -0.07 Yes Philippines 1985 -0.08 Yes
Ghana 1997 -0.09 Yes Portugal 1984 -0.08 Yes
Honduras 1974 -0.09 Yes Senegal 1973 -0.06 No
Hong Kong 1975 -0.09 Yes Senegal 1981 -0.07 Yes
Hong Kong 1985 -0.07 Yes Sierra Leone 1992 -0.09 Yes
Hong Kong 1999 -0.07 Yes Sierra Leone 1998 -0.07 Yes
Hungary 1991 -0.07 Yes Singapore 1986 -0.09 Yes
Indonesia 1982 -0.09 Yes Syria 1977 -0.09 Yes
Iran 1981 -0.20 Yes Syria 1987 -0.07 Yes
Iran 1987 -0.07 Yes Thailand 1986 -0.06 No
Jamaica 1980 -0.07 Yes Thailand 1998 -0.07 Yes
Jamaica 1985 -0.07 Yes Togo 1983 -0.08 Yes
Jordan 1974 -0.08 Yes Togo 1993 -0.07 Yes
Jordan 1990 -0.14 Yes Turkey 1980 -0.06 No
Kenya 1970 -0.07 Yes Uganda 1979 -0.07 Yes
Kenya 1985 -0.08 Yes Uganda 1988 -0.06 No
Korea 1998 -0.09 Yes Uruguay 1983 -0.08 Yes
Lesotho 1971 -0.08 Yes Uruguay 1990 -0.06 No
Lesotho 1991 -0.07 Yes Venezuela 1971 -0.08 Yes
Malawi 1970 -0.12 Yes Venezuela 1983 -0.07 Yes
Malawi 1992 -0.18 Yes Zambia 1986 -0.08 Yes
Malaysia 1987 -0.07 Yes Zambia 1995 -0.11 Yes
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doubles the number of collapses in the 1990s and is also significantly larger than the
1970s. Latin America has been particularly prone to collapses in the 1980s, with
more than half of the collapses concentrating in this period, known as ‘‘the lost
decade’’; however, also in Asia more than 60% of the episodes in the region are
concentrated in this period.
Now that we have identified the output collapses in the sample we are in the
position to analyze how TFP behaves afterwards. This is done in the next section.
3 TFP after output collapses
The main objective of this section is to find out whether output collapses are
associated with persistent, possibly permanent effects on aggregate productivity.
Therefore, we construct counterfactuals of post-collapse TFP to compare with
‘‘actual’’, i.e. measured, TFP. As we are interested in making predictions of what
would have been the TFP of a country had the collapse not occurred, the models
are estimated using only country data prior to the collapse as well as the full
sample data for countries in our sample without a collapse (which act as a control
group).
The simplest counterfactual model would be linear growth forecasts of the TFP
level over time t for each country i (which we refer as the ‘‘linear model’’):
lnðTFPitÞ ¼ ai þ bit þ eit ð1Þ
Alternatively, we also consider a model that only includes the evolution of the
productivity frontier allowing for ‘‘country specific absorption’’, in the spirit of
Parente and Prescott (2005):
Fig. 1 Number of episodes by decade and region
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lnðTFPitÞ ¼ ai þ ki lnðTFPft Þ þ eit ð2Þ
A counterfactual forecast based a model (1) would fail to detect systemic changes
over time to the rate of growth of world productivity that may influence each
country’s potential TFP. A slowdown or an acceleration of the productivity frontier
that may have occurred after the collapse could influence the post-collapse evolution
of TFP. In order to account for this effect, we augmented the linear model with a
term that captures the evolution of the productivity frontier:
lnðTFPitÞ ¼ ai þ bit þ k lnðTFPft Þ þ eit ð3Þ
where TFP
f
t refers to the TFP of the productivity frontier and is proxied by the
simple average of TFP for the 20 developed countries in the sample. We refer to this
model as the ‘‘country-specific trend with absorption’’ counterfactual.
For completeness, we also consider a ‘‘country-specific absorption with trend’’
model:10
lnðTFPitÞ ¼ ai þ bt þ ki lnðTFPft Þ þ eit ð4Þ
Countries with more than one episode of output collapse should also have one
counterfactual path for TFP for each collapse. Therefore, for the purpose of
estimating the counterfactual models presented above, the index i refers to each
episode, possibly in the same country. All the episodes are estimated using data from
the beginning of the sample until the year prior to the collapse, which is consistent
with the null hypothesis that collapses do not have persistent effects on TFP.
Given that we are interested primarily in long-run effects, we would like to
compare the actual level of the TFP of a country that has collapsed with its
counterfactual at the farthest possible moment of time after the collapse has
occurred; this is, at the end of our sample period or just before another collapse
occurred. Hence, for each episode we construct the log-difference of actual TFP
versus its counterfactual and then test if on average this difference is significantly
different from 0. The results are shown in Table 2. It is important to point out that
the level of TFP in any specific year could be unusually high or unusually low
because our measure of TFP is affected by the business cycle, which introduces
noise to the tests. Therefore, we compare the counterfactual in a particular year not
with measured TFP in that year but with its trend.11
The first column in Table 2 shows the case when counterfactuals are estimated
with the linear model specified in Eq. (1) above. On average, measured TFP ratio is
around 22% points below its counterfactual at the end of the sample. In addition, the
t-statistic shows that the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected at
standard levels of confidence. For the other three alternative counterfactuals, the
10 It is important to point out that some sort of stationarity of TFP. Standard unit root tests (Maddala and
Wu 1999; Im et al. 2003; Pesaran 2003; and Levin et al. 2002), confirm this assumption for the countries
in the sample that did not experience a collapse. However, for the subsample of countries that experienced
a collapse, the unit root assumption cannot be rejected. An alternative estimation of the impact of an
output collapse in the absences of stationarity is presented later in this section.
11 The trend is calculated with the Hodrick–Prescott filter applied to the entire TFP series, using a
smoothing parameter of 6.25 suggested by Uhlig and Ravn (2002).
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resulting TFP difference is smaller (between 7.4 and 17.2%), but statistically
significant at a confidence level of 95%. Thus, typically TFP does not return to
pre-collapse levels. In all four cases, TFP ends up significantly below the level of
TFP that would have prevailed if the collapse had not occurred. Therefore, when
we consider all the models, results indicate that output collapses have been
followed by very persistent negative effects on productivity. This evidence is
consistent with the findings of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) regarding a higher
incidence of structural breaks in TFP trends in developing countries compared to
industrialized countries.
It is worth noting that the end-of-sample period is, on average, 13.6 years after
the collapses have occurred. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that the failure of TFP
to return to its potential level is due to the lack of time to recover within the sample.
In order to explore this issue further, in Fig. 2 we plot the log-difference between
measured TFP and the counterfactual (based on Eq. 4) at the end of sample against
Table 2 Measured TFP versus counterfactual TFP for baseline collapses
Series/sample Observations Linear
trend
Country-specific
absorption
Country-specific
trend with
absorption
Country-specific
absorption with
trend
HP-filtered TFP series 75 -0.222 -0.172 -0.074 -0.123
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
Original TFP series 75 -0.224 -0.174 -0.076 -0.125
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Latin America and
the Caribbean
22 -0.275 -0.241 -0.136 -0.192
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Sub-Saharan Africa 28 -0.151 -0.136 -0.006 -0.090
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.92 0.06
Middle East and
Northern Africa
8 -0.374 -0.341 -0.135 -0.277
p-value 0.11 0.04 0.51 0.09
Asia 13 -0.185 -0.041 -0.060 0.008
p-value 0.00 0.35 0.19 0.86
Rest 4 -0.243 -0.138 -0.135 -0.088
p-value 0.08 0.16 0.19 0.28
1970’s 22 -0.340 -0.178 -0.041 -0.115
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.60 0.06
1980’s 34 -0.200 -0.180 -0.078 -0.126
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.01
1990’s 19 -0.125 -0.153 -0.104 -0.127
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01
The table presents t-statistics of the null hypothesis that the log-difference between measured TFP and
counterfactual TFP is equal to zero. Baseline collapses refer to episodes with an output gaps greater
than 6%
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the years left to reach the end of sample for each episode. As seen clearly in the
scatter plot, there is a slightly positive correlation of 0.11, but it is not significant at
conventional levels (its p-value is 0.36). Thus, a systematic bias due to sample
truncation does not seem to be driving our results regarding lack of recovery in TFP.
Furthermore, even if we were to consider the point estimates as significant—they
imply that on average—it would take around 45 years to close the gap between
measure and counterfactual TFP.
The following line in Table 2 measures the difference of the original TFP series
rather than the filtered series with respect to the four alternative counterfactuals. As
it can been, the tests show similar economic and statistical levels of significance.
Therefore, in the rest of the paper we will consider the filtered TFP series.
The remaining lines of Table 2 analyze the performance of TFP in the aftermath
of an output collapse across regions as well as across decades. In the case of Latin
America, all models to construct TFP counterfactuals clearly support the argument
that TFP failed to return to its potential trend after an output collapse. Furthermore,
TFP contractions seem to be more severe in LAC, implying on average an
incremental decline between 5.3 and 6.9% points (depending on the counterfactual).
For the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the results also indicate a significant decline in
TFP in three of the four counterfactuals. Although the magnitudes are slightly
smaller, they still imply an economically significant decline of between 9 and 15%
in TFP. For the MENA region, the point estimates of TFP reductions are quite large,
and significantly at conventional levels in two of the cases. However, while the
small sample might reduce the statistically significance, TFP declines seem to be
pretty large in the region. In the case of Asia, the evidence shows no permanent and
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significant reduction in TFP. Only for the linear-trend counterfactual there is a
significant decline. A similar result is found for the countries aggregates in the
residual region. Thus, we find strong evidence that collapses have generated long-
run detrimental effects on productivity in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and to
some extent also for the MENA region, while the evidence is weak for Asia.12
Across decades, the results in Table 2 show that collapses in all periods had a
significantly detrimental effect on TFP, although in the 1990’s they seem to have
been less severe.
In Table 3, we present the same tests as in Table 2, but restricting ourselves to
the 5% largest collapses in the sample. The results are quite similar to those
presented in Table 2. LAC and MENA are the regions with the most intense and
significant contractions, while in Asia output collapses do not seem to have long-
lasting effects on TFP.
3.1 Robustness checks
Table 4 presents some basic robustness checks of our results so far. First, we
analyze whether our results are sensitive to the way our capital stock is measured.
This issue is potentially of importance, given that TFP is measured as a residual, and
therefore it would capture potential measurement errors in the remaining variables.
The alternative measure is based on Caselli (2005) who considers different steady-
state conditions (based on the growth rate of investment rather than GDP and
investment-to-GDP ratios as we do in this paper).13 As shown in the first line of
Table 3, with this alternative measure of TFP, the decline in TFP following an
output collapse is somewhat smaller in magnitude—between an 8 and 16%—but
economically and statistically significant for all four counterfactuals.
Next, we consider whether large declines in the output gap are different from
small collapses, by considering the largest quartile of collapses in our sample versus
the rest.14 As lines 2 and 3 of the table show, both types of episodes imply a
significant decline in TFP. Therefore, our results are not driven by a small number
of extreme events. Furthermore, large collapses are associated with significantly
larger declines in TFP.15 Large collapses are associated with declines in TFP that
are between 64 and 205% more severe than small collapses.
Finally, we investigate whether there are differences between episodes if they
were preceded by a boom in the previous 3 years, defined symmetrically as a
positive output per capita gap of at least 6%, or not. Collapse could be a
consequence of unsustainable booms. This could have important welfare implica-
tions, because if only episodes that were preceded by a boom suffer a reduction in
12 Our results from the linear model, although not strictly comparable, are in line with those in Cerra and
Saxena (2008). They find that after a recession, output does not recoup the level associated with the linear
extrapolation of the original trend.
13 See Caselli (2005) for more details.
14 These are collapses with output gap below -8.9% in our sample.
15 In all four cases, a test of equal means between samples is rejected at conventional levels of
significance.
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TFP, then the pre-collapse gains should be discounted from the after-collapse
welfare costs. Furthermore, costs could be associated with a more volatile output
(second moments), rather than reduction in the mean. As our results show, although
there is some evidence of TFP reduction being more severe if the output collapse
was preceded by a boom, episodes are not associated with a previous boom also
bring significant losses in terms of TFP levels. Thus, mean-reversion arguments
represent only a fraction of the TFP reduction that follows an output collapse.
Next, we perform additional robustness checks by estimating the effect of output
collapses directly using econometric panel techniques, which allows us also to use
the countries that did not have a collapse as a control group. In particular, we
estimate a variation of Eqs. (1)–(4) including a dummy Post-collapseit which takes
the value of 1 from period t onwards if in year t there has been a collapse in country i.
As shown in Table 5, panel fixed-effects estimations for the four models all yield a
significant reduction of TFP after an output collapse of between 8 and 10%. It
should be pointed out that the difference in magnitude between these estimates and
those presented in Tables 2–4 is probably driven by the fact that in the regressions
Table 3 Measured TFP versus counterfactual TFP for Top 5% Collapses
Series/sample Observations Linear
trend
Country-specific
absorption
Country-specific
trend with
absorption
Country-specific
absorption with
trend
HP-filtered TFP series 65 -0.251 -0.188 -0.076 -0.126
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
Original TFP series 65 -0.251 -0.187 -0.075 -0.125
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00
Latin America
and the Caribbean
20 -0.318 -0.282 -0.170 -0.224
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Sub-Saharan Africa 23 -0.190 -0.152 -0.008 -0.091
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.08
Middle East
and Northern Africa
8 -0.367 -0.335 -0.118 -0.262
p-value 0.13 0.05 0.57 0.10
Asia 12 -0.196 -0.013 -0.021 0.049
p-value 0.01 0.81 0.80 0.43
Rest 2 -0.147 -0.100 -0.069 -0.049
p-value 0.62 0.68 0.74 0.81
1970’s 19 -0.395 -0.165 -0.010 -0.078
p-value 0.00 0.03 0.92 0.27
1980’s 30 -0.215 -0.207 -0.090 -0.144
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.01
1990’s 16 -0.147 -0.177 -0.128 -0.148
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
The table presents t-statistics of the null hypothesis that the log-difference between measured TFP and
counterfactual TFP is equal to zero
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we are capturing the average TFP loss, while in our previous analysis we are
focusing on the loss at the end of sample. In column 5 of Table 5, we estimate the
counterfactual from Eq. (4) correcting for potential autocorrelation and correlated
panel-errors. The estimates show the presence of autocorrelation in the error term.
However, the estimated impact remains very similar to the previous estimates, with
a significant average decline in TFP of around 9.3%. Alternatively, in the next
column we estimate the model in first-differences, which does not rely on the
stationarity assumption of TFP; again the estimated effect is quite similar: 8.7%.
Finally, in the last column we estimate a dynamic panel model addressing the
potential endogeneity of the collapse. As the results show, there continues to be a
significant decline in TFP in the aftermath of a collapse. While the coefficient is
smaller than in the previous estimates, it should be pointed out that to be
comparable, one has to compute the implied long-run elasticity taking into account
the effect of the lagged dependent variable. When doing so, the estimated long-run
decline in TFP following a collapse is around 12.5%.16
In order to analyze closer the dynamics of TFP in the aftermath of an output
collapse, we follow Cerra and Saxena (2008) and estimate the following VAR-style
panel:
lnðTFPitÞ ¼ a þ
X4
j¼1
bj lnðTFPitjÞ þ
X4
j¼0
djDitj þ eit; ð5Þ
Table 4 Robustness checks
Observations Linear trend Country-specific
absorption
Country-specific
trend with
absorption
Country-specific
absorption with
trend
Caselli TFP measure 75 -0.151 -0.161 -0.080 -0.098
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01
Large collapses
(1st quartile)
20 -0.336 -0.226 -0.146 -0.172
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01
Small collapses
(rest)
55 -0.181 -0.153 -0.048 -0.105
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00
Preceeded by a
boom
26 -0.269 -0.197 -0.104 -0.145
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01
No previous
boom
49 -0.197 -0.159 -0.058 -0.111
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00
The table presents t-statistics of the null hypothesis that the log-difference between Hp-filtered measured
TFP and counterfactual TFP is equal to zero
16 This results from -0.031/(1-0.752) = -0.125.
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where Dit is the collapse dummy which takes value one if there is an output collapse
episode in country i at time t.
In Fig. 3, we show the cumulative impulse-response function from assuming a
collapse at time t, based on three of the alternative econometric models considered
in Table 5. Under the three specifications, on impact there is a similar decline in
TFP of around 8%, and a deepening of the effect in the following 2 years. While in
the first-difference model the effects amplifies to a cumulative decline in TFP of
around 20% after 5 years, the decline stabilizes at 12% using the corrected panel-
error model (Prais–Winsten estimator), and there is some recovery under the fixed
effects model, but still a significant TFP loss of around 8.5%.17
The potential issue of endogeneity is not easy to deal with, given the lack of
obvious and valid instruments. In Fig. 4, we explore the temporal profile of the
impact of an output collapse on TFP including two-year leads and lags of a collapse
dummy (taking value one if at time t there is an output collapse in country i).18
Significant impacts previous to the date of the collapse would be a clear indication
of reverse causality. As Fig. 4 shows, this is not the case. There is no significant
Table 5 Panel estimation of the impact of an output collapse on TFP
Fixed
effects
Fixed
effects
Fixed
effects
Fixed
effects
Prais–
Winstena
First-diff. Arellano–
Bondb
Lagged
log(TFP)
– – – – – – 0.752
(0.026)***
Post-collapse -0.083
(0.022)***
-0.103
(0.024)***
-0.080
(0.022)***
-0.087
(0.023)***
-0.093
(0.008)***
-0.087
(0.006)***
-0.031
(0.011)***
Observations 3210 3210 3210 3210 3210 3210 3210
R-sq within 0.711 0.669 0.719 0.677 – – –
R-sq overall 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.980 0.107 –
AR1-error
term
– – – – 0.882 – –
AR(2) test (p-
value)
– – – – – – 0.795
Additional controls
Fixed effects Country
effects
Country
effects
Country
effects
Country
effects
Country
effects
Country
effects
Trends Country-
specific
– Common Country-
specific
Country-
specific
Country-
specific
Country-
specific
TFP frontier – Country-
specific
Country-
specific
Common Common Common Common
*** Significant at 1%
a Panel-corrected correlated standard error estimation
b Robust variance–covariance errors estimation
17 Given that the fixed effects estimator is clearly biased and inconsistent this latter result should be
interpreted with care.
18 The presented estimates are based on the Prais–Winsten estimation under the counterfactual
specification from Eq. (4).
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anticipated effect on TFP. The major effect takes place at moment t, with also
additional significant effects in two following years. Clearly, although this analysis
yields some interesting results and makes reverse causality less likely to be driving
our results, it is not possible to discard the simultaneity of TFP and collapses based
on this analysis. In order to explore this issue further, in the next section we study
how TFP evolves during collapses that are associated with rather exogenous shocks.
4 Exploring the impact of different types of shocks
In this section, we explore a series of shocks that have been identified by the
literature as sources for serious macroeconomic disturbances. The definitions and
sources are similar to the shocks used by Becker and Mauro (2006).
The first group of shocks we analyze involves more exogenous economic shocks,
which allows us to explore further the importance of endogeneity of collapses
driving our results. First, we consider episodes of negative terms of trade (TOT)
shocks, represented by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a country’s
TOT growth rate falls below two standard deviations.19 In addition, we also
consider global external shocks such as oil shocks and increases in international
interest rates. Oil shock episodes are identified as years in which the price increase
of crude oil is greater than one standard deviation. The resulting years when oil
shocks took place are 1974, 1979, 1999 and 2002. International interest rate shocks
are identified as years in which the effective Federal Funds rate increased by more
than 150 basis points. Finally, the natural disaster dummy is constructed based on
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Fig. 3 Cumulative impulse-response to an output collapse
19 Terms of trade data are from the IMF’s internal WEO database.
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the data from Em-Dat (2009) 20 and takes the value of 1 if more than a 0.01% of the
country’s population was killed in the incident.
The second group of shocks involves macroeconomic shocks that might be
triggered by external events, but potentially also some domestic determinants, such
as currency crises, banking crises and sovereign debt crises. We define a currency
crisis in two ways. A real currency crisis is defined following Ferna´ndez-Arias et al.
(2002) as a situation in which the real exchange rate depreciated by more than 10%
in any month, and is represented by a dummy variable taking the value of one in the
year of the crisis. A nominal currency crisis is defined as an episode with 10%
depreciation in any month.21 For banking and debt crises, we rely on episodes
reported by Laevan and Valencia (2008).22
Finally, a third group of variables includes political shocks such as internal
wars and major regime changes (e.g. coups d’e´tat). The war dummy takes the
value of 1 if the country is involved in an internal civil war according to
information from the Correlates of War database, while the political shock dummy
is constructed as an event with a major regime change (deterioration) base on the
Polity IV database.23
-0.16
-0.14
-0.12
-0.10
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
2+t1+ttt-12-t
95% Confidence Interval
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Fig. 4 Estimated impact over time on TFP of an output collapse at time t
20 They are available at www.em-dat.net.
21 Clearly, the latter situation also includes high inflation environments with a high nominal depreciation.
We also tried different thresholds, e.g. considering 5% depreciation, and results did not change
significantly.
22 This comprehensive database covers events in 163 countries between 1970 and 2007. The database
includes most episodes in the literature for banking crisis, like Bell and Pain (2000), Caprio and
Klingebiel (2003), Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), as well
as debt crisis reported by Detraigiache and Spilimbergo (2001), Manasse and Roubini (2005), and
Reinhart et al. (2003).
23 We define this shock as a deterioration of 3 or more points in the country’s polity index.
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The degree of association of the different types of shocks with output collapses is
shown in Table 6. With the above definition of shock, international interest rate
shocks and currency crises are the most frequent shocks, while natural disasters,
debt crises and political shocks are the rarest events. However, when considering the
conditional frequency of observing an output collapse given that a particular shock
materializes, debt crises and TOT shocks appear to be the most strongly associated
with output collapses, while other types of shocks such as interest rate shocks are
noisier and less informative of a subsequent output collapse. This can also be seen
when looking at the noise-to-signal ratios, which is defined as the ratio between
false-signal frequency (proportion of times that a shock signals a crisis without an
output collapse occurring) to accurate-signal frequency (proportion of times that a
shock signals correctly a crisis).
In Table 7, we test the effects on TFP associated with output collapses associated
to the different types of shocks described above. In order to perform these tests, we
associate a shock to a collapse when it takes place in a one-year window around that
collapse.24 Columns 1–4 present the tests for the four alternative counterfactuals
considered in the present paper. There are interesting differences across types of
shocks regarding the severity of the associated collapse as well as the degree of
persistence of the effects on TFP, but in all cases the estimated effect on long-run
TFP is negative.
For the first group, of rather exogenous shocks, TOT shocks, international
interest rate hikes and oil price shocks are associated with a significant decline in
TFP in three out the four counterfactuals. However, in the case of natural disasters,
there is no significant impact on TFP. The magnitudes for TOT, interest rate and oil
price shocks are quite similar, with point estimates for the TFP loss between 8 and
19%. Thus, we find that TFP fails to attain its pre-crisis path and, therefore, suffers
permanent erosions. Although this evidence does not imply that TFP in always
completely exogenous and that there are no feedback effects, for shocks primarily
Table 6 Shocks and output collapse episodes
Type of shock Number
of events
Number
of collapses
Frequency
of shock
Frequency of
collapse given shock
Noise-to-
signal
Terms of trade shock 83 32 0.038 0.386 0.057
Interest rate shock 584 34 0.267 0.058 0.574
Oil price shock 219 18 0.100 0.082 0.396
Natural disaster 32 3 0.015 0.094 0.343
Real currency shock 376 40 0.172 0.106 0.298
Nominal currency shock 104 29 0.047 0.279 0.092
Banking crisis 67 20 0.031 0.299 0.083
Debt crisis 36 15 0.016 0.417 0.050
Political shock 39 9 0.018 0.231 0.118
Internal war 140 13 0.064 0.093 0.346
24 While this helps to increase the number of collapses for each test, it is reasonable given that there
might be timing problems concerning the year to which a particular crisis/shock is assigned.
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based on exogenous events there is a significant decline in TFP.25 In this sense,
collapses related to international financial market turmoil, have significantly
negative effects on long-run TFP. Furthermore, some of the propagation of these
shocks might be through large swings in the real exchange rate and triggering debt
crises as the literature on sudden stops emphasizes (e.g. see Calvo and Talvi 2005).
Therefore, in the next line of Table 7, we focus on a related type of shocks,
systemic sudden stops (3S), introduced by Calvo et al. (2006) (CIT hereafter). These
episodes are defined as a sharp current account reversal (more than two standard
deviations) that coincides also with a spike in the aggregate spread of sovereign
bonds over Treasuries (measured by JP Morgan’s EMBI spreads) for all emerging
markets. The systemic nature of this type of shocks ensures the exogeneity of the
underlying primary shock driving the output collapse.26
CIT focus on a group of emerging countries that are integrated to world capital
markets and therefore potentially exposed to 3S events. Within this group they
identify a sample of sixteen episodes of output collapses that occurred in the context
of 3S as defined in their paper. Of these episodes, our sample includes only seven,
primarily because CIT use a less stringent threshold for output drops than we do.27
In the fifth row of Table 7, we analyze the evolution of TFP in the event of a 3S
episode. According to our estimates, 3S episodes are associated with a subsequent
decline in TFP similar in magnitude as for the other external shocks, but slightly
larger (declines between 15 and 26%). Although the sample size is very small, these
effects are significant again for three of the four counterfactual at a 10% level. Thus,
in general TFP does not return to its counterfactuals in the aftermath of a 3S
episode, such that with our metric, there is no Phoenix miracle for TFP.
For the next group of shocks, macroeconomic disturbances (large real and
nominal depreciations, as well as banking and debt crises) that might be more
endogenous and partially caused by the shocks analyzed above, we find that they are
consistently associated with an economically and statistically significant decline in
TFP in the aftermath of such a shock, with an estimated TFP loss with respect to the
counterfactual of between 23 and 10%. Furthermore, political disturbances and civil
wars have a particularly severe effect on TFP, about twice the size as the previously
analyzed shocks. Of course, part of this effect might well be endogenous, in the
sense that a previous deterioration in economic conditions (in particular TFP) might
be one of the drivers of social unrest. Finally, the five episodes in our sample that
are not associated with any of these types of shocks have only a transitory effect on
TFP.
While exploring the particular mechanisms through which these different shocks
affect TFP is beyond the scope of the paper, it is important to note that the evidence
provided in this section allows us to make some causal connections between output
25 Two-thirds of the episodes (47 out of the 75) are associated with at least one of these shocks.
26 Of course, exogeneity of shocks does not imply that their impact does not interact with TFP levels,
such that the final severity of the TFP collapse might well be reinforced by feedback effects. However, we
analyzed the correlation between initial levels of TFP and the subsequent decline for each type of these
shocks and did not find a significant correlation.
27 These seven collapses are: Brazil 83, Chile 83, Mexico 95, Peru 83, Venezuela 83, Uruguay 83 and
Thailand 98.
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collapses caused by external events and the evolution of TFP. Next, we compare the
different type of shocks from a welfare perspective.
5 The costs of productivity losses
In the previous sections we showed that output collapses are associated with
persistent declines in aggregate productivity. In this section, we show that the costs
of productivity drops in terms of expected GDP foregone can be substantial. Even if
aggregate productivity recovers, the temporary productivity losses can be dear to the
economy. Recovery from a collapse is a costly process that may require significant
resource reallocation. Firms and entire sectors contract while others expand. Labor
and capital is freed in some places to be used in others. All this transition may affect
the aggregate efficiency of the economy until the process is completed. Therefore,
even in the episodes in which aggregate TFP returns to its potential level the
transition can be very costly. More so, of course, if recovery takes a long period of
time or never fully materializes, as it appears to be the case on average in our
sample.
The ex post welfare cost of output collapses can be measured as the consumption
forgone due to the reduction in productivity. Since TFP enters as a multiplicative
term in our production function (with an exponent equal to one), any reduction in
TFP (in percentage terms) implies the same reduction in GDP and, for given factor
accumulation, on consumption.28 We will conservatively neglect welfare costs
associated with lower factor accumulation on account of the lower returns brought
by lower productivity as well as the decrease in investment due to more investment
distortions, given that they do not have first-order effects on welfare.29 However, it
could be argued that given the low probability of these events, the ex ante welfare
loss could be considerably lower.30 In order to assess the expected welfare loss due
to GDP collapses, we proceed as follows.31 First, we use the frequency of episodes
as an estimate of the probability of an episode. These probabilities of a collapse in
the presence of the different shocks in a given year are presented in column 6 of
Table 7.
Next, we compute the discounted present value of the difference between actual
GDP and counterfactual GDP assuming that the differences between actual and
counterfactual TFP levels estimated in Tables 6 and 7 are maintained in the future.
This assumption does not appear particularly restrictive given our previous analysis
and upon inspection of TFP trajectories (see the appendix in Blyde et al. (2008).
28 The overall output foregone would amount to this direct output loss plus the indirect output foregone
due to lower factor accumulation.
29 This result follows directly from the envelope theorem.
30 This argument would be in the spirit of Lucas (1987) who argues that welfare losses in the US due to
business cycle fluctuations are small in economic terms.
31 The estimate we are obtaining should be interpreted as the average expected output cost for a GDP
collapse of similar characteristics to those observed in our sample.
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Then, we discount this loss by a real rate of 4% per annum.32 Thus, the expected
loss is computed as:
p
X1
t¼0
1
1 þ r
 t
ln TFPoð Þ  ln TFPcð Þ½  ¼ p1 þ r
r
ln
TFPo
TFPc
 
; ð6Þ
where p is the probability of a collapse, r is the real interest rate, and the final term is
the direct GDP loss incurred every year due to the difference between the observed
level of TFP after the collapse and its counterfactual level. It should be pointed out
that this is actually a lower bound of the ex ante welfare cost of growth collapses
because we are not considering the indirect effects of a lower level of TFP on
profitable factor accumulation, investment distortions, as well as transition costs.
Equation (6) can be seen as the welfare cost for an agent with a period log-utility
and lifetime present discounted utility given by:
X1
t¼0
bt ln Ctð Þ; ð7Þ
where b is the subjective discount factor and C consumption. Focusing on the steady-
state values of consumption with a collapse or the observed consumption value (sub-
index o) and the counterfactual (sub-index c), the welfare loss would be given by:
X1
t¼0
bt ln Coð Þ 
X1
t¼0
bt ln Ccð Þ ¼ 1
1  b ln
Co
Cc
 
ð8Þ
Imposing that b = 1/(1 ? r) and that consumption in steady state is proportional to
output (as the neoclassical growth model implied), we get that Eq. (8) multiplied by
the probability of a collapse is equal to (6).33
The resulting magnitudes of multiplying this discounted present value by the
probability of a collapse are presented in the last column of Table 7 for the different
shocks. Overall, on average the welfare cost of collapses are economically
significant. In terms of contemporaneous GDP, for the average output collapse
implies an expected loss equivalent to 9% of GDP (see last row of the table).
Furthermore, although output collapses associated to each of the different shocks are
less likely to occur, the implied losses are still large. The rather exogenous external
shocks to TOT, interest rates and oil prices imply a GDP loss of 2.3–3.8%, similar
also to debt and banking crises (which are both less likely to occur, but more
severe). Collapses associated to real and nominal depreciations, as well as civil wars
twice as costly, around 5% of GDP.
Clearly, these magnitudes are large. It is interesting to point out that our
conservative estimates are similar to the welfare costs of rare disasters estimated by
Barro (2006). Even neglecting transition and investment effects and without
considering risk aversion, our welfare estimates of output collapses are larger than
32 Observe that for developed countries usually the standard discount rate is between 2 and 3%, such that
our estimated welfare losses are rather conservative.
33 Again, we are focusing here on first-order effects, leaving aside (based on envelope theorem
considerations) the fact that factors would also react to changes in TFP.
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the standard welfare costs of eliminating fluctuations in consumption in developing
countries, which according to Pallage and Robe (2003) are equivalent to around
0.34% of permanent consumption in developing countries.34
TFP reduction is a pure welfare cost, permanent in the case of TFP destruction
and transitory if TFP eventually recovers after a transition. As mentioned earlier,
lower investment commanded by lower TFP would not entail a net welfare cost as a
first-order approximation. Similarly, lower investment on account of additional
distortions to the incentives to invest (e.g. higher risk of expropriation) would also
generate only second-order welfare costs measured in terms of consumption.
Nevertheless, lower investment would have a first-order impact on output level and
growth, traditional measures of countries’ performance. It may be interesting
therefore to have a sense of the magnitude of investment effects on output and
compare them with the pure productivity effect. However, as shown in Blyde et al.
(2008), while output collapses sometimes have been accompanied also by a decline
in investment ratios which could be linked to increases in investment distortions, the
evidence on the latter is rather limited and its economic magnitude tends to be
small.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyze the dynamics of TFP after output collapses and estimate the
implied welfare losses. Using a large panel of developed and developing countries
we find that almost all these collapses took place in developing countries.
We find strong evidence of persistent productivity destruction in Sub-Saharan
Africa and in particular for Latin America and the Caribbean: the output collapses
during the debt crisis in the 1980s meant more than a ‘‘lost decade’’ to the region.
The evidence on the enduring impact of collapses on productivity for the other
regions is somewhat weaker.
These long-term TFP shortfalls after output collapses are not merely a reflection
of productivity weaknesses prompting both. When we constrain the sample to
output collapses caused by exogenous shocks, we still find a similarly negative
impact on TFP. In particular, global capital market disruptions and domestic shocks
related to sudden stops (such as real exchange rate shocks) have the most destructive
impact on TFP, as well as civil wars. The evidence suggests that there is irreversible
productivity damage.
Our analysis also shows that the welfare costs of productivity losses can be very
substantial. Permanent effects on productivity entail permanently lower GDP and
lower long-term GDP growth. Even if effects are temporary and aggregate
productivity recovers after a period of decline, the costs associated with the
temporary but persistent losses in productivity can be large for the economy. A
conservative estimation of welfare cost associated with the possibility of an output
34 In our metric the present discounted value (using a discount rate of 5% also) of these costs would be
around 4.8% points of GDP (assuming that consumption is around 70% of GDP), half of the estimated
effect of a generic collapse.
Output collapses and productivity destruction 383
123
collapse indicates that this contingency is more costly than the recurrent cost of
business cycle fluctuations.
From a policy perspective, these large welfare costs associated with output
collapses indicate the importance of focusing macroeconomic policies in developing
and emerging economies on crisis prevention and risk management rather than
reducing business cycle fluctuations. This paper suggests that there is a big premium
on prudent policies against the risk of an extreme output downfall, given that
policies able to prevent a crisis could have an important impact on long-term output
levels.
Finally, it is worth noticing that the prevalence of output collapses in Latin
America and developing countries in general contributes to low long-run growth
and lack of convergence. In fact, a conservative estimate implies that on average
persistent productivity reductions after an output collapse lower GDP levels by
around 12% compared to its counterfactual. Even without any additional
deterioration from investment distortions, such a reduction every 33 years (the
observed frequency of output collapses) amounts to an average reduction of 0.4%
points of GDP per worker growth per annum.
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Appendix
See Table 8
Table 8 Sample
Algeria Hong Kong Panama
Argentina Hungary Papua New Guinea
Australia India Paraguay
Austria Indonesia Peru
Belgium Iran Philippines
Benin Ireland Portugal
Bolivia Israel Senegal
Brazil Italy Sierra Leone
Cameroon Jamaica Singapore
Canada Japan South Africa
Chile Jordan Spain
China Kenya Sri Lanka
Colombia Korea Sweden
Costa Rica Lesotho Syria
Denmark Malawi Thailand
Dominican Republic Malaysia Togo
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